The Eritrean Accord: Harmonized Constitution

By Mejlis Ibrahim Mukhtar

I: Introduction

We thank all our contributing partners who responded to our call for input and provided valuable insights and feedbacks to address the issues we raised, issues that we recognize are  too numerous to address here in one single document. We believe these issues, and the case of refugees in particular, will not receive the proper attention they deserve by addressing them at this time. Therefore, we will serialize and publish our findings in the coming weeks and months in our upcoming website eritreancovenanet.com, which will have features of providing instant feedback. For now, we present our first installment that addresses the urgent question of what a pro-change resistance and opposition groups need to do to galvanize the Eritrean public in order to effect a positive change in our country. We will identify these issues, analyze them, and offer our views and proposals on a possible way forward, in a pragmatic spirit of compromise. But first, we would like to offer some historical context to help articulate our position.

1.       To understand these issues, we asked the ultimate stakeholder—the  Eritrean public—on what their expectations are from those leading the charge for change. We talked to people from all walks of life inside Eritrea, in refugee camps, and the Diaspora. We read articles written in Arabic, English, and Tigrinya in major Eritrean websites. We monitored events and political developments in our region. We listened to the PJFD regime’s opponents and proponents alike, and we even spoke to the former and current civilian and military leadership in the Eritrean government, including those who are very close to the president of Eritrea. We listened with empathy to the youth who dodged the bullets of border guards and risked their lives to cross the desert and sail dangerous seas in pursuit of freedom. We kept our thoughts with those who are left behind holding the line, and those on the other side of the line, as we lament the conditions that compelled both of them to take up arms—a tragedy whose urgency many Eritrean leaders fail to comprehend, or understand the gravity of the youth’s predicament.

2.       Covert and overt individuals and leaders mounting boycotts and employing  stalling tactics similar to that of unity talks of the 70’s, and insisting on achieving regional and perhaps world peace first, is an out-of-touch approach that could neither help nor lead our people in this fast changing world of instance information flow. Those of us who once were members of the EPLF draw from our experiences of knowing Isaias personally, with firsthand account of his whimsical behavior. Like those who chose a lesser evil, we were not duped by his Machiavellian schemes, but we chose to keep our eyes on the prize to secure Eritrea’s independence first while contending with those who were propping Isaias before he turned against them and now are in the opposition. We tremendously benefited from those of us who are close to the members and leaders of the ELF and all its offshoot political organizations. We continue to reach out to our compatriots in the ethnic based organizations to understand their views and concerns. We respectively nod to the religiously motivated prosecutions of Christians and Muslims who are trying to bring a sense of morality to the public life. We debated and argued with our Muslim and Christian friends and compatriots who fought side by side with some of us, marched in demonstrations with others, and walked the long walk to achieve Eritrea’s independence. We challenge each other’s assumptions to avoid any cognitive bias of seeing information that confirm our already held judgment more favorably than the ones we cannot stomach. In short, we tap into our diverse backgrounds and experiences of activism in order to develop a broader perspective by listening, questioning, and learning with an aim of acquiring a comprehensive understanding of the prevailing as well as the dissenting views. We strive to put our fingers on the pulse of every segment of our society to appreciate its concerns while at the same time keep a bird eye’s view on their implications to the bigger picture.

3.       We also take note of the concerns of the many people within the PFDJ’s ruling circle, who privately concede the colossal failures of the PFDJ in mitigating the incalculable damage that a single man has done to our people. However, they take issues with our characterization of the regime as ethnocratic even when we point out to the widely noted fact (but yet to be documented) that the majority of the military leaderships are from the Hamasien region with the most trusted ones coming from Karneshim. While we agree that this is reminiscent of African big men of the 1960 and 70’s with a kernel of truth to it, we respectively disagree with the view that this is no different than the mode of operation that Idi Amin, Bokassa and their likes utilized by appointing loyal bodyguards and beneficiaries from their own tribes.

4.       Our contention, as we have rested our case in the Eritrean Covenant, is not with the appointment of the ethnically privileged personnel of the regime only, but rather with the ethnocratic state apparatus built to serve and promote the policies, practices, and goals to empower one privileged ethnic group at the detriment and subjugation of the rest of the Eritrean people who make up more than 50% of the Eritrean people and whose presence is almost non existence in the military and civilian leadership. Indeed, we have yet to see a challenge that refutes the preponderance of evidences we provided in demonstrating a textbook case of an ethnocratic regime. (See more recent glaring evidence in Annex IV)

5.       However, their point that the Tigrigna speaking Christians are not monolithic is well taken as a reminder to those who are vying for position of power through ethnic loyalty. We would like to elucidate that our characterization of the regime members as “ethnocentric” does not concern but those who perpetuate the ethnocentric practices, the elite of the Kebessa who are determined to keep the injustice and inequality alive. The struggle to get rid of the ethnocentric culture is not the responsibility of one or another Eritrean sect, it is a process of democratization that all Eritreans, Christians and Muslims, are waging together. People who have nothing to do with keeping the destructive legacy alive should not feel targeted simply because they are not. However, those who are at the core of the forces that carry such legacy would naturally feel targeted. Indeed, they are targeted as destructive elements and no one should shade tears when their evil methods are exposed.

6.       We are aware of the fact that the overwhelming majority of the members and leaders of the three distinct groups that make up EPDP, come from Seraye, Hamasien, and Akele-Guzai. Just like the Muslim dominated organization, the Kebessa is also not monolithic. Such identities are natural and it is up to the people to carry them if they so wish. No political force should impose an engineered identity on people against their wish.

7.       We are also aware that some Kebessa supremacists, who once propped Isaias and now are brandishing constitutionalist and democratic credentials to meet NGO funding requirements while in reality are conducting sectarian  and regionalist agendas as evidenced by their exclusionary practices of the mere photo-op conferences they have been bank rolling recently. They, and everyone else, should learn from history. Even the most ardent supporters of the Unionist Party found too late that they had outlived their usefulness when they found out the gig was up.

8.       We remind them of what happened  when they were pitted against each other in 1952 when Abuna Markos (Orthodox, Akele-Guzai) openly and publicly protested the appointment of Tedla Bairu (Karneshim, Hamasien, Protestant) as chief executive, Feshazion Haile (Protestant) to as chief of the economics department, Mesfin Gebrehiwet (Protestant) as secretary, Teklehaimanot Bokru (non practicing Orthodox) as vice president. The tit-for-tat acrimony that paralyzed the first Eritrean Assembly was set off by a  region based power struggle when Tedla Bairu fired Tedla Uqbit (Adi Mengonti, Seraye), the Police Commissioner, and illegally arrested Degiat Abraha Tessema (Maareba, Akele-Guzai). Consequently, Abuna Markos was replaced by Keshi Demetrius (Seraye) and Tedla Bairu was replaced by Asfaha Weldemichael (Akele-Guzai). Some, like the Commandos, redeemed themselves by joining the EPLF while the fate of the likes of Tedla Uqbit and his deputy Goitom Gebrezghi (Mefalso, Seraye) was long sealed before they realized the damage they have done to their people and before they knew the gig was up.

9.       The elites of the federation era lived in despair and died in regrets leaving in their wakes a cursed legacy of blunder that befell on subsequent leaders who repeatedly failed to realize that they are just pawns in a game of treachery played by Mafioso-like thugs who only play by their own rules and decide when to ‘pull the curtain’ when the gig is up for everyone.

10.    Recently, we have seen how the G-15 fell out of favor with Isaias and how he managed their degree of usefulness to him by constantly promoting and demoting them.  Even the educated elite were not spared from the intra Kebessa squabble. For example, in 1995, Andeberhan Woldegiorgis (Akele-Guzai), who had no academic or management experiences, was appointed president of Asmara University with the task of quelling the spectacle created by the dysfunctional staff of Asmara University’s spat (mostly between Akele-Guzai and Hamasien) that led to the summarily firings of about forty professors and instructors and effectively closed the university, thus denying an entire generation an opportunity for higher education. Again, in 2000, at the behest of the crisis that erupted within the ruling clique, Ambassador Semere Russom  (Seraye), prodded the late Dr Tekie Feshazion (Seraye) and Dr. Gebrehiwet T. Giorgis (Seraye) to back off from their commitment to be part of the G-13, at the last minute, because of a reignited long-standing regional feud with Dr Berekhet Habte Selassie (Hamasien, Protestant), Dr Asfew Tekheste (Hamasien, non practicing Orthodox), Paulos Tesfagiorgios (Hamasien, a devout Orthodox), Araia Debessai (Akele-Guzai) and Kassahun Checole (Hamasien), who are all now in exile, were among the first of the regime’s supporters to find out that the gig was up.

11.    More astonishingly, in 1970, when the widely publicized three-year long Ethiopian military campaign reached Adi Tekelzan, the edge of Kebessa, after finished burning the lowlands, the privileged Eritrean students, many of whom sent by Haile Selassie for schooling in the US in reward to their parents’ roles, broke from the Ethiopian Student Union North America (EUSNA) and formed “Eritrean for Liberation in North America, EFLNA/ENASA” and coined the term “Amharic chauvinism” and charged the Amhara as the sole oppressors of all Ethiopian nationalities. Ironically, the charge against the Amhara is the very abyssal arrogance that they themselves degenerated to now. While masquerading as progressive ultra-leftist student movement, they privately recruited members by urging Eritreans to join them in order to stop Ethiopia from killing Christians while in fact they were recruiting members in response to Nehnan Elamanan call to organize. The intra Kebessa rivalry soon crept in to settle the purported left wing ideological disputes between the alleged revisionist socialists and Maoist communist cadres, a seminal event that, though led to the demise of the organization, resulted in many joining the ELPF to become Isaias’ hacks and ideologues. In reward and in the condition that they do not raise the case of Menkaa, such as the murder of Dr. Mussie (Akele-Guzai), Isaias fast tracked their membership to his organization’s secret communist party without the mandatory Ta’aleem (military training) requirement. Subsequently, they were appointed to ERA and other EPLF offices overseas and later became department heads, and now are Isias’ ministers and ambassadors. Many who felt were deceived are now in exile though they do not seem to have learned their lessons. Some, who are still with the regime, are telling us in Orwellian double speak, “Let us not be divided” after helping the regime rip our communities apart. The then chairman of ENASA, Mengistab Yisaq (Himberti, Hamasien) died, reportedly committing suicide, in mysterious circumstances in New York City in the summer of 1979.  Like Abuna Marikos, Tedla Uqbit, and others who died in mysterious circumstances, perhaps it was too late for Mengistab when he knew the gig was up.  

12.    Except for Dr. Berekhet and few others, whose sympathetic responses to the Eritrean Covenant endeared them to Eritrean Muslims and perhaps secured their place in history, the majority of the Kebessa elite have remained silent and indifferent to the sufferings and persecution of Eritrean Muslims. In 1994, when the founder of the Eritrea Human Rights group, Paulos Tesfagiorgios, who was also head of the Norwegian Church Services in Asmara, was approached to report the disappearance of the Muslim teachers in Keren, he zealously supported the government’s claim that their arrest was a necessary security precaution.  It did not take long for Isaias’ security apparatus to catch up with every segment of our society. Like Paulos, now exiled, many of the prosecuted groups, who include students and journalists, who were earlier indifferent to the sufferings of others, could not have known when the gig would be up.

13.    In summary, the history of the unrepresentative and tiny Kebessa elite, from the federation era up to now, can be characterized by careerism, opportunism, self-promotion and a quest for personal advancement at any cost. Now it is finding itself, albeit belatedly, consistently in the wrong side of history. This profound disappointment led us to conclude that the tiny elite “neither represents the  majority of Christians, who are suffering severe economic hardship while their human and civil rights are being violated, nor identifies with the vast majority of Eritrean Muslims who are suffering persecution, de facto exclusion, institutionalized discrimination, and systematic disfranchisement.” Still, we take solace in the fact that the “privileged clique is a small minority that is mostly made up of Tigrinya-speaking men, Christian Highlanders who now are in their 60’s and whose number is estimated to be a maximum of several hundreds.” Moreover, we are encouraged by today‘s generation who seem to be breaking away from the past. We hope they had learned the lessons to right the wrongs and would not place themselves in a position where they would not know when the gig would be up.

14.    But looking at the bright side, we would remiss if we fail to mention that the overwhelming majority of ordinary Eritreans whom we spoke to share the unflinching commitment to an Eritrea at harmony with itself and at peace with its neighbors, and assert its rightful place among the nations of the world, as an independent state that provides justice, peace, and security and prosperity for all its citizens. It is precisely for this reason that we never lost faith in this decidedly Eritrean dream, though is has eluded us for so long, to which we are fiercely committed. So, what are the overriding concerns and expectations, and how do we address them? 

II: Risk &Uncertainty

1.       As much as Eritreans pursued change—the type of Justice-inspired change—it has eluded them. For decades, their struggle was needlessly stretched out for years due to different suspicions and mistrust that had poisoned the political atmosphere.

2.       Every epoch carried with it gloomy future as politicians deepened the divide, the suspicion and mistrust for petty political gains—the elite has been scaring the communities from each other as if they are destined to a perpetual conflict whose main motivation and goal is social hegemony.

3.       After each era, Eritreans discovered that the scare tactics of yesteryears has only been dishonest agitating messages intended to serve the interest of the elite that has always been behind the miseries of the common Eritrean citizen.

4.       But as soon as the people discover the lies of yesteryears, the tricksters were ready with another novel scare-message packaged in a new form—and they always had naïve and blind followers, who as unfailingly would find too late that the gig was up.

5.       The recent dilemma that Eritreans face, and their fear of the unknown, thus their fear of change, is no different. Some politicians have managed to evoke primordial fear factors, and employed old tactics, and managed to polarize our people.

6.       The principal concerns that are delaying the changes we aspire to effect are manifested in the form of a sense of anxieties and fears; anxiety over perceived risks and fears emanating from historically observed risks, both based in one or more of the following concerns.

1.       Fear of a power vacuum and a state of anarchy and mayhem.

2.       Fear from an Ethiopian invasion and occupation, a message hammered by the ruling party for the last ten years and had become the pretext for human and civil rights volition.

3.       Fear of a horrific terror event in Western capitals traced back to Eritrea leading to total or partial occupation of Eritrea by some coalition forces to remove or demand the removal of Isaias or/and PFDJ.

4.       Fear of the disintegration of Eritrea or losing some of its territories due to the demand of self-determination by some ethnic and religious organizations.

5.       Fear of a coup-de-etat that would bring the same generals who are mostly responsible for oppression of the people.

6.       Fear of the government losing of control over generals who are becoming brazen by the day running illicit enterprises and thus eventually forming an out of control shadow government.

7.       Fear of exacerbation of widely reported social tensions between the military and civilians and among military officers.

8.       Fear of a failed or aborted coup-de-etat resulting in precipitous disintegration of the army.

9.       Prolonged mandatory conscription leading to mutiny, insurrection, and revolt that the government fails to subdue or contain.

10.    Fear of escalation of religiously motivated assassinations of Eritreans and PFDJ leaders and onset of sectarian and ethnic violence.

11.    Fear of further UN sanction leading to severe economic hardship, Zimbabwe like runaway inflation, currency devaluation, sovereign debt defaults, and widespread famine calling for the intervention of the international community.

12.    Fear of a civil war due to the proliferation of arms among Eritreans (organized groups, government militias, the armed forces and individuals)

13.    Fear of global Islamists adopting the cause of Eritrean Muslims leading to radical Muslim onslaught and state sponsored terror unleashed to counter it, which would  further alienating  Eritrean Muslims.

14.    Fear of Eritrea formally listed as terrorist supporting state and the implications of being considered a safe haven for terrorist.

15.    Fear of any unknown event that is catastrophically so damaging and too difficult to manage for anyone.

7.       Eritreans will not be able to go through an effective and efficient transition to democracy unless these risks are well understood and precautions are taken to face any eventuality caused by any of the risks mentioned above.

8.       The potential events we consider most frightening are the things that we collectively want most to protect, for instance, Eritrea’s independence. Thus, perception of risk is as important as the risk itself. Our understanding of these risks is inherently tied to our culture and value system.

9.       To understand these risks, we first need to carefully distinguish them from uncertainty. Of course, there is the inherent uncertainty, not knowing what the future holds is implicit in life. Then, there is the induced uncertainty, a paralyzing mental fog created in the mind. This is created when information is overwhelmingly ambiguous, intentionally made to scarce, incomplete, and uncertain and when evidences are purposefully designed to appear conflicting, confusing, and inconclusive, or fabricated, or deliberately distorted through denial and deceptions by the regime and other sources. That is, the whole propaganda machinery brought to bear against any critical judgments or healthy skepticism.  

10. Unlike risk, uncertainty implies objective and subjective inability to determine the probability or the impact of certain future event. 

11. The dictionary defines risk as the probability that any event will turn a measurable loss. There are two components to risk: likelihood and severity. How likely is the risk? If it does occur, how big an impact will it have? Often, it is difficult to answer either of those questions. In some cases, when enough statistical data is available, risk can be quantified in the way insurance companies use actuarial principles to price policy coverage by assigning conditional probabilities to risky lifestyle behaviors. Political risk cannot be deconstructed in terms of its cause, probability, and impact because, using Donald Rumsfeld colorful remarks there are known knowns (knowing that we know), known unknowns (knowing that we do not know) and unknown-unknowns (not knowing that we do not know) in any political risk. Eritrean leaders and elites seem exceptional challenged by the notion of the unknown-unknowns for always failing to know when the gig is up.

12. Given enough historical data, we could at least attempt to tackle the known unknown aspect of political risk by utilizing some of the macroeconomic indicators to predict the aforementioned economic events that could contribute to catastrophic failure. For example, we could utilize similar probabilistic techniques that are used to determine the likelihood of default of sovereign debt based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative assessment of the country’s political and economic risks. However, Eritrea, being the North Korea of Africa, and its obsession with hiding data, even to international development agency or researcher, the paucity of any publicly available data does not lend itself to such analysis.

III: Scenario Analysis

1. When data are lacking, scenario analysis is useful tool in understanding uncertainty. It does not produce probabilities and predictions, but helps us understand a number of plausible paths on how the future might develop. It helps us think of the unthinkable outcomes that we could prepare for accordingly by taking precautionary steps to avoid them or, if they come to pass, mitigate them by taking offsetting actions.

2. The fear for a power vacuum, in our opinion, is real. But that can be mitigated, as we propose here, by having a workable, agreed upon and sound transitional strategy.

3. An Ethiopian invasion of Eritrean could happen for one of many reasons: due to the regional confrontations and the no-war no-peace situation; the influx of Eritrean refugees into Ethiopia and other countries, and; to protecting regional interests that bring the two countries face to face towards a destructive path. Any of the above reasons could bring a confrontation between the EPRDF and PFDJ, thus, exposing Eritrea to an Ethiopian invasion. But there is also a possibility that the PFDJ could attack Ethiopia to break the ten-year old standstill.  If any of the supremacist opposition forces came to power in Ethiopia, they need no reason to invade—they feel and believe that Eritrea is their lost real-estate.

4. The PFDJ regime faced frequent disturbance, crises but not catastrophic ones that reached to the level of an external threat, except when Ethiopian troops reached the outskirt of Dekemhare in 2000. The regime has a history of military adventures and may pounce again if it finds an opportunity to destabilize any neighboring country.

5. Given Isaias’ cozy relationship with Al-Shabab of Somalia, the chances of a horrific terror event being traced or linked  to Eritrea is not far fetched.

6. The fear of disintegration of Eritrea along religious and ethnic lines is unfounded because there is no Eritrean political force that is not for the protection of Eritrea’s sovereignty and unity. However, the provocations by some zealot Eritreans (led by politicians) could be too much for the ethnic groups to swallow and may prove to be too risky. Still, these groups are not petty to trade their commitment to a united Eritrea because of an irresponsible insult or provocation by some elite; but again, the provocation carries another seed on communal disharmony. That is the real risk that could lead to the disintegration of the country.

7. Coup de etat is a real risk and Eritreans know that there are elements within the armed forces that would not waste an opportunity if they get one, to topple the regime and bring an end to the Eritrean crisis. But since the ruling system is so centralized and tightly knit by nepotism and corruption, that opportunity has not been easy to come. However, as the situation in Eritrea gets even worse, some elements might think of absolving themselves and redeeming their history by overthrowing the regime. In any case, the forces that bring about change could be the Swar Al Dahab (former Sudanese General who successfully restored civilian rule through a coup de etat by keeping his promise of holding an election and stepping down) type who would hand over power to the people, a Mengistu type who would be equally brutal as the current regime. There is a possibility that the members of the ruling clique who would act out of fear and be more aggressive towards the people in order protect themselves.

8. In the absence of justice and equality, in the event of a disorganized exit of the regime, the situation might encourage every-one-for-his-own mentality. This in turn would group people along sectarian, regional and ethnic lines thus making the risk of a civil war plausible.

9. If Muslims continue to be marginalized and branded suspect in their own country, the moderate spirit of Eritrean Muslims would lose and the situation would attract the radical elements that would naturally ally themselves with the extremist and radical elements of the region, regional elements that are ready to ally themselves with anyone who is willing to wreak havoc in any place.

10. All of the above mentioned risks can be mitigated if Eritreans could draw an inclusive and democratic transitional strategy based on justice that follows a well defined legal path towards restoring democracy and rule of the law. If our political history is a witness, power struggle would reverse any meaningful process of transition and turn it into chaos and anarchy. This should be prevented from happening by drawing conditions for being part of interim and transitional governments.

IV: Risk Mitigations

1. The fear of a risky political situation in post PFDJ Eritrea is a well founded fear and cannot be glossed as a minor issue. The incompetence of the combined Eritrean struggle to unseat the PFDJ has resulted in a frustrated population. So many opportunities had been created for the resistance by the rogue regime but the combined Eritrean struggle lacked a focused process of weakening the regime.

2. Though it is the nature of politics to compete for power, Eritrean politician’s impatience with beginning power struggle when the regime that is supposed to be overthrown is still in power has been disheartening and demoralizing for many Eritreans.  Years have been wasted without any meaningful achievements and the cost/benefit analysis has been lacking in the Eritrean arena. This, in result, has deepened the uncertainties for a post PFDJ regime.

3. The absence of a clear-cut vision and a binding agreement between the political players has aggravated the situation and increased the uncertainty.  This can only be alleviated if the people are assured that the would-be leaders, aspirants to power, and others have set up the necessary precautionary measures and laid down a system to lead Eritrea through a transitional period. But since transitional leaders have the habit of staying in power indefinitely once they control the reigns of power, it is necessary that any leader who is part of a transitional leadership in post Isaias Eritrea, would not seek any political office for at least three-years as mentioned above.

4. This will ensure that the transitional period would be entrusted to skilled and competent technocrats who would stabilize the country, resuscitate it, oversee the making of a national constitution, electoral laws, manage national security, and establish foreign, fiscal and social policies for a one-year period after which an elected government assumes power.

5. This precaution would ensure that transitional leaders would focus on establishing a sound governing and developmental infrastructure and not focus on building power bases for their parties since they are banned by law from engaging in partisan politics during the transitional period. This will also help attract non partisan elements to serve in the transitional period.

V: The Way Forward

1. To take the above risk mitigation measures and incorporate them into our vision for Democratic Eritrea, we propose that there should be legal framework by which Democracy and rule of law would be restored. We emphasis on the word restored because we believe Eritrea had enjoyed a considerable degree of democratic practice in the 1950’s, had a constitution, and was ruled by law until Ethiopia abrogated the federal agreement.

2. One of the thorniest issues that has not helped us moves forward is the impasse on the question of which constitution should Eritrea follow after the removal of Isaias. The last thing we want in post-Isaias era is some group or individual, whether from inside or outside the country, ruling by some arbitrary military degree and emergency laws and proclamations.

3. To avoid the risks enumerated above, we are suggesting the following general framework for a safe transition to democracy.

VI: Harmonized Constitution

1. There are those who contend that the 1952 Constitution refers to the Federation era and was drafted by the UN and has severe limitation in terms of women’s right to vote and be elected to office. While recognizing this limitation, there are also those who vehemently oppose the 1997 constitution on the basis that it is  in a sense a PFDJ constitution and comes short in guaranteeing their rights as citizens and does not take into consideration issues that are dear to them. Both groups believe, neither 1952 nor the 1997 constitutions represents the will of the people and needs to be amended in the future.

2. In the spirit of comprise and to break this deadlock, pending a permanent constitution that all parties must eventually agree to, we took the liberty and married the two constitutions and called it a Harmonized Constitution as a working document for the proposed  Interim and Transitional periods.

3. We worked off  the 1997 text and, among other things,  added Articles from the 1952 Constitution(highlighted in yellow), specifically  borrowing the following Articles:

Article 20: Freedom of conscience and religion

Article 21: No discrimination to the detriment of any religion

Article 22: Recognition of religious bodies As persons before the law

Article 23: Religious instruction and worship in public school

Article 26: Personal statuses

Article 27: Properties right

Article 28: Languages

4. For a country that is multicultural and multiethnic, we believe there must be a strong Commission which will ensure the human rights of all Eritrean are protected. So, we added (highlighted in grey) Article 62: Human and  Peoples Rights Commission

5. To address the rights of nationalities, we added points to Article 1(5), 1(6),1(7)

Article 1: The State of Eritrea and its Territory

·         The government in Eritrea shall be a federal system whose powers shall be shared between the federal government and the regional state governments, which shall consist of Akele-Guazi, Barka, Danakil, Gash-Setit, Hamasien, Sahel, Semhar, Senhit, and Seraye and the capital city of Asmara.

·         The member states shall be based upon social and economic realities,   political pragmatism, historical and ancestral rights alone and not based on origin, race, ethnicity, nationality, or confession.

·         The member states’ boundaries shall be that of the de facto Administrative Districts of 1952 with the addition of Asmara.

6. We also revised Article 7(5) and added explicit reference to political parties.

·         The organization and operation of all political parties and public associations and movements shall be guided by the principle of national unity and democracy.

VII: National Accord

1. There should be a National Accord that all Eritrean political parties and organizations must pledge their full commitments to abide by and recognized it as the only legally acceptable paths towards restoring Democracy and rule of law in Eritrea. We provide a sample template document in the Annex I that can be modified and agreed upon by all concerned parties.

2. We call on the signatories of the National Accord not to recognize, and keep on resistance and opposing, any group whether a signatory or not, that comes to power and does not abide by this accord.  

3. In order to envision what the post Isaias/PFDJ political situation would look like, we outline the following road map for the three stages:

Annex I

The Legal Path for Restoring Democracy & Rule of Law

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